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What does it mean to ‘have a life’? Many of us perhaps set the scale 
of achievements at work and in our personal lives to measure the 
accumulation of assets and relationships that mean something to us. 
Having not just a life but a ‘good life’, then, would be the attainment 
of such things in a society of reciprocal recognition and care where 
there is time not only for the working day, familial duties and social 
obligations, but also to enjoy those things that mean something to us 
through play, curiosity, and rest. These activities of flourishing 
would be bodily practices made in the reproduction of life free from 
anxiety or from threats of the loss of security, or too much sense of a 
future. 
 
The problem, as Lauren Berlant sees it, not only in this latest book 
Cruel Optimism but throughout her work to date, is that ‘for many 
now […] the traditional infrastructures for reproducing life—at 
work, in intimacy, politically—are crumbling at a threatening pace’ 
(5). The everyday ‘ordinary’ of people’s existence, the scene where 
one must ‘live’ that ‘life’, has become ‘an impasse shaped by crisis in 
which people find themselves developing skills for adjusting to 
newly proliferating pressures to scramble for modes of living on’ (8). 
Cruel Optimism is Berlant’s first book since her ‘national 
sentimentality’ trilogy, a project that charted the ‘emergence of the 
U.S. political sphere as an affective space of attachment and 
identification’ (1997: x). Whereas much of that trilogy focused on 
readings of 17th-19th century texts, Cruel Optimism takes off from 
where the trilogy ended, with the U.S. Reagan administration and 
the replacement of civic modes of behaviour with private intimate 
acts as a measure of citizenship. Cruel Optimism goes further in 
exploring the ‘intimate publics’ of contemporary life-building, to ask 
‘what happens to fantasies of the good life when the ordinary 
becomes a landfill for overwhelming and impending crises of life-
 LOCKWOOD rCRUEL OPTIMISM                                         CM REVIEWS r2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net r2  
building and expectation whose sheer volume so threatens what it 
has meant to “have a life” that adjustment seems an 
accomplishment?’ (3). 
 
Berlant first published on ‘cruel optimism’ in 2006 in the journal 
differences and outlined there the mechanisms of a subject’s 
optimistic attachment to an object of desire, or rather ‘a cluster of 
promises we want someone or something to make to us and make 
possible for us’ (2006: 20). Berlant argues that this way of attending 
to the desired object as forged through promise allows us to 
recognize that our attachments are inherently optimistic, although 
the caveat is they may not always ‘feel optimistic’ (2006: 20). This 
concept of attachment is central to the argument of the book, and 
Berlant leans lightly on psychoanalytic thought, in particular Adam 
Phillips, Eve Sedgwick and Melanie Klein, to argue that it is the 
strength of this affect—optimism—to this ‘cluster of promises’ that 
forms the ‘good life’ that keeps us bound to the fantasy, even as it 
crumbles in the ‘overwhelming ordinary disorganised by capitalism’ 
(8, original emphasis). But why this particular fantasy of the ‘good 
life’? What is so powerful about it? And why are other ways of living 
so rarely available to us if we want to ‘count’? That is the political 
charge that drives Cruel Optimism and which pushes Berlant to track 
the attachments we have to fantasies of the ‘good life,’ and why it is 
so hard to detach ‘from what is already not working’ (263). Readings 
of John Ashbery, a short story by Charles Johnson and Geoff 
Ryman’s historical novel Was that appeared in the journal article are 
joined by interrogations of ‘the production of the present’ (4) in the 
films of Laurent Cantet and Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne, as well 
as in Colson Whitehead’s The Intuitionist and William Gibson’s 
Pattern Recognition, and a range of shorter films from the U.S. and a 
reading of Western obesity as a condition of cruel attachment 
through Mary Gaitskill’s novel Two Girls, Fat and Thin. 
 
It is this difficulty in detaching ‘from what is already not working’ 
that makes optimism for a better life cruel. Optimism is not always 
cruel—and for a book that so explicitly and depressingly tracks the 
pressures to make a (normative/any) life under ‘that porous domain 
of hyperexploitive entrepreneurial atomism that has been variously 
dubbed globalisation, liberal sovereignty, late capitalism, post-
Fordism, or neoliberalism’ (167), the emotional tenor of this book is 
ultimately optimistic. That is, its hope is that it incite others to 
analyse the crises of the present moment; and for those analytic and 
creative responses to lead to ‘new idioms of the political, and of 
belonging itself, which requires debating what the baselines of 
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survival should be in the near future, which is, now, the future we are 
making’ (262). But as Berlant admits, the majority of the book ‘is 
not so buoyant’ (22). That’s because cruel optimism is a powerful  
 
relation of attachment to compromised 
conditions of possibility whose realisation is 
discovered either to be impossible, sheer fantasy, 
or too possible, and toxic. What’s cruel about 
these attachments, and not merely inconvenient 
or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their 
lives might not well endure the loss of their 
object/scene of desire, even though its presence 
threatens their well-being, because whatever the 
content of the attachment is, the continuity of its 
form provides something of the continuity of the 
subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living 
on and to look forward to being in the world. (24)  
 
That is, the attachment is itself too much to bear losing, where the 
‘the loss of the promising object/scene itself will defeat the capacity 
to have any hope about anything’ (24). This is most clearly 
articulated in Berlant’s chapters five (‘Nearly Utopian, Nearly 
Normal’) and six (‘After the Good Life, An Impasse’) where she 
directs her tracking of cruel optimism in the Belgian films La 
Promesse (1996) and Rosetta (1999), written and directed by Luc 
and Jean-Pierre Dardenne, and Laurent Cantet’s assessments of 
French labour in the 1990s, Resources humaines (1999) and L’emploi 
du temps (2001). In Rosetta, for example, the protagonist scrambles 
not for a ‘good life’ but for any life so as not to lose the ability to 
hope that life might be better—not to ‘disappear down the cracks’ 
(158). Rosetta’s fantasy is not ‘at a grandiose scale’ (157) of, say, a 
permanent position in a factory, or dreams of un-fraught maternal 
love, but whose success in gaining a temporary, precarious role in 
the grey economy ‘evokes a scene of an entirely imaginable 
normalcy whose simplicity enables her to rest without anxiety and, 
for the first and only time in the film, to have a good night’ (157). 
What Berlant articulates as unfolding here is this ‘adjustment’ to 
capitalism seen as an achievement: ‘The ongoing prospect of low-
waged and uninteresting labour is for Rosetta nearly utopian: it 
makes possible imagining living the proper life that capitalism offers 
as a route to the good life. That the route is a rut matters not’ (157). 
 
These ‘affects of aspirational normativity […] in the project of life-
building on the bottom of contemporary class society’ (157) 
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provide Berlant with examples of wanting wrongly, or rather, the 
ways in which individuals are educated to want the good life, and 
have come to rely on habituated repetitions to get it: the rhythms 
rewarded in middle-class scenes of living and that catch people in 
‘cruel optimism’s double-bind’ (263). That these rhythms never in 
fact belonged to that particular family, household or nondominant 
group, but are found only in the normative fantasies to which their 
faces are turned, is for Berlant exemplary of the ‘poetics of 
misrecognition’ (159) that is distinct from misunderstanding, and, 
in its cruel form, lays bare ‘the intensity of the need to feel normal’ 
(180). This need is ‘created by economic conditions of non-
reciprocity that are mimetically reproduced in households that try to 
maintain the affective forms of middle-class exchange while having 
an entirely different context of anxiety and economy to manage’ 
(180). But even within such a reading, the ‘poetics of recognition’ 
offers Berlant, and us, the insight that we are ‘teachable’ (159) and 
that if one fantasy can be attached to, then so can others. It is this 
note of optimism that Berlant ends the book upon, arguing that ‘the 
energy that generates this sustaining commitment to the work of 
undoing a world while making one requires fantasy to motor 
programmes of action, to distort the present on behalf of what the 
present can become’ (263). 
 
Berlant is an astute articulator of the forms at use in the work of 
speculative theory such as affective structures. In particular she 
makes explicit the importance of thinking through genre in exposing 
fantasies of the normative life. Berlant argues we will only ‘learn to 
process x happening as an emerging event’ (5) and understand how 
‘conventional genres of event potentially foreclose the possibility of 
the event taking shape otherwise, as genres y and z’ (5) if we commit 
to this close attention. As Berlant writes, ‘The pain of paying 
attention pays me back in the form of eloquence’ (122). As with all 
of Berlant’s work, that eloquence is hard-fought for by both writer 
and reader. Cruel Optimism is not an easy read in form or content—
at times depressing, moving, distressing, emphatic — nor should it 
be. After all, ‘[t]his kind of attention to the becoming-event of 
something involves questions about ideology, normativity, affective 
adjustment, improvisation, and the conversion of singular to general 
or exemplary experience’ (5). 
 
Her main genre for tracking the sense of the present is the ‘impasse’. 
An impasse might be a situation one wants to leave but cannot, not 
only because of the content of the situation but because of the 
attachment to the fantasy to which that situation might lead: the 
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promise of a better life. For Berlant, ‘speaking of cruel optimism, it 
may be that, for many now, living in an impasse would be an 
aspiration’ (5). The book uses the impasse for attending to 
attachment in relation to politics and the political. The impasses of 
the present moment often take place in the former (within the 
antagonistic scene of politics) whereas strategies for negotiating the 
impasse that are not merely a repetition of the normative case, and 
which can then break out of cruel optimism, usually take place 
within the latter, the political. For Berlant, ‘the political [is] that 
which magnetises a desire for intimacy, sociality, affective solidarity, 
and happiness’ (252) and manoeuvres the subject into a Kleinian 
depressive position, where she is able to acknowledge ‘the broken 
circuit of reciprocity between herself and her world but who, 
refusing to see that cleavage as an end as such, takes it as an 
opportunity to repair both herself and the world’ (259). 
 
The cleavage between self and world is not marked by trauma but 
rather, in the overwhelming present moment, better recognised in 
the state of ‘crisis ordinariness’ because of its non-dramatic 
potentials (see for example the chapter on obesity, ‘Slow Death’); 
because ‘a concept like “crisis ordinariness” better keeps open the 
problem of the form heightened threat can take as it is managed in 
the context of living’ (101). For Berlant, ‘crisis ordinariness’ is a 
more functional concept because, as she sees it, ‘long-term problems 
of embodiment within capitalism, in the zoning of the everyday and 
the work of getting through it, are less successfully addressed in the 
temporalities of crisis and require other frames for understanding 
the contexts of doing, being, and thriving’ (105).  
 
This is a useful crystallisation of thought in the development of 
affect theory and continues the work done by others such as 
Kathleen Stewart in Ordinary Affects, and Anne Cvetkovich’s An 
Archive of Feelings, for attending to the attritional rather than 
climactic nature of ‘the wearing out of the subject’ (28) under the 
‘exhausting pragmatics of the everyday’ (262). In her introduction, 
Berlant puts forward a strong argument for the way affect ‘saturates 
the corporeal, intimate, and political performances of adjustment’ 
(16) and, through careful and responsible critical attention, ‘releases 
to view a poetics, a theory-in-practice of how a world works’ (16). As 
Berlant says, one of the book’s central claims is that ‘the present is 
perceived, first, affectively’ (4) and that for the present moment to 
make sense to us we must attend to its saturation and modes of use. 
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One of the most rewarding aspects of Berlant’s work and of Cruel 
Optimism in particular is the sheer transformative force within the 
field of the political that the analysis of chosen texts offers. Berlant 
feels the need to defend herself on this point, arguing that: ‘The key 
here is not to see what happens to aesthetically mediated characters 
as equivalent to what happens to people but to see that in the 
affective scenarios of these works and discourses we can discern 
claims about the situation of contemporary life’ (9). This may seem 
like an a priori assumption for some, but for scholars who worry 
(about the economic imperative in the future of research, perhaps) 
that the humanities have little to offer as ‘ballast against wearing out’ 
(116), Berlant’s skill in textual analysis as a means to activate the 
political offers a rewarding respite from the anxiety of everyday 
ordinariness within the academy. After all, Cruel Optimism would 
include in its scenes of ‘incoherent narratives of what’s going on and 
what seems possible and blocked in personal/collective life’ (4) 
would also apply to academic investigation. Berlant is required 
reading that should somehow help ‘activist theorists and artists back 
to the question of what kind of form a gesture is, what kind of 
imminent expressivity it holds, and what kind of affective pedagogy 
might be effected by it’ (261) in the work of ‘having a life’ make 
sense. I like to think that this is in the way the environmental writer 
Wendell Berry says he wants to live a life that ‘makes sense’,  a being 
in the world that Aubrey Street Krug and Kristin Van Tassel 
embellish as ‘the possibility of consistency and coherency’ (2012: 9) 
of living and thinking combined. It is not really a criticism of Berlant 
or Cruel Optimism to have wanted a chapter on texts that deal with 
the overwhelming environmental ‘crisis ordinariness’ of capitalist 
consumption in an age of climate change; that perhaps is for another 
critic. But if Berlant were to, what a critique it would be. 
 
That we can understand fantasies of the ‘good life’ through 
attachments to optimism, but remain aware of how optimism can 
sometimes be—and more often, is—cruel, allows us to step back 
from the normative roles that benefit the structures of power and 
political and capital economy. It is here that Berlant assesses living 
through impasse as doing ‘work on suspending the rules and norms 
of the world’ (49) so we can see those rules more clearly, and 
question them. That is, they ‘show us how to pay attention to the 
built and affective infrastructure of the ordinary, and how to 
encounter what happens when infrastructural stress produces a 
dramatic tableau’ (49). This is Berlant’s challenge to us in the 
contemporary moment, as the global financial crisis of 2008 bleeds 
into the ‘crisis ordinariness’ of an adjusted set of expectations for 
 LOCKWOOD rCRUEL OPTIMISM                                         CM REVIEWS r2012 
 
 
www.culturemachine.net r7  
‘having a life’, the result of which is already congealing ‘decades of 
class bifurcation, downward mobility, and environmental, political, 
and social brittleness [to] create manifest crisis situations in 
ordinary existence for more kinds of people’ (11). 
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